



**The Projection of Classical Chinese Military Strategies onto Politics  
and Corporate Relations: A Multi-Case Study Analysis**

**Shalva Chikhladze**

President of the Caucasian Association of China Studies,

Lecturer at Tbilisi State University

Tbilisi, Ilia Chavchavadze Avenue #1

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8265-7847>

Email: [Shalva.chikhladze@tsu.ge](mailto:Shalva.chikhladze@tsu.ge)

Phone: +995 558 36 53 31

**Abstract**

Classical Chinese military strategies constitute an integral and invaluable component of global philosophical and literary thought, offering profound insights into the evolution of military, political, and diplomatic reasoning within one of the world's oldest and most enduring civilizations. Given their substantive diversity and universal applicability, this article examines four seminal classical strategic treatises—The Art of War, The Thirty-Six Stratagems, The Methods of Sima, and The Six Secret Teachings—and their application in contemporary Chinese political and corporate relations. Employing a case-study methodology, the analysis focuses on the practical implementation of specific stratagems from these texts and their adaptation to modern Chinese political and corporate interactions. This investigation represents a novel contribution to Georgian academic discourse, underscoring the enduring significance of traditional philosophical thought and its modern reinterpretation in shaping contemporary Chinese

business and geopolitical strategies. The case studies encompass an examination of Chinese corporate and political maneuvers within global processes over recent decades, aiming to elucidate the causal relationship between these practices and their classical strategic foundations.

**Keywords:** The Art of War; The Thirty-Six Stratagems; The Methods of Sim; The Six Secret Teachings; Classical Chinese Military Strategies.

## **introduction**

The rich literary heritage of Chinese civilization stands as one of its most distinctive features, encompassing millennia of continuous existence. Over centuries, this vast repository of knowledge has attained classical status, occupying a prominent place within the global literary canon. Alongside historical chronicles, poetic anthologies, and philosophical and religious texts, the Chinese tradition is further enriched by The Seven Classical Military Strategems (Wujing Qishu), a collection unparalleled in the literary legacy of other ancient civilizations.

The compilation of The Seven Military Classics (Wujing Qishu) is traditionally attributed to Emperor Shenzong of the Song Dynasty (960–1279 CE), who consolidated these texts into a unified corpus, subsequently incorporating them into the dynasty's historical records, bureaucratic examinations, and military training programs (Sawyer, 1993). Beyond these seven foundational treatises, other critical works—such as The Thirty-Six Stratagems and The Six Secret Teachings—further augment this strategic tradition. Collectively, these texts encapsulate military-political doctrines, governance principles, and tactical recommendations, transmitted across generations and now serving as essential reference material for military academies and strategy scholars worldwide.

Given the extensive scope and intricate philosophical depth of classical Chinese strategic thought, a comprehensive analysis within a single article is unfeasible. Therefore, this study focuses on four key texts whose insights remain relevant to contemporary Chinese political and corporate relations:

The Art of War (Sun zi Bingfa)

The Thirty-Six Stratagems

The Six Secret Teachings (Jiang Ziya)

The Methods of Sima (Sima Rangju)

Open-source and declassified materials reveal that modern Chinese education systems and decision-making elites actively study, analyze, and apply these centuries-old strategic methodologies (Liu, 2024). Consequently, identifying specific stratagems and their real-world applications holds significant value for Georgian academia, where such discourse remains underexplored. This article examines case studies from recent decades, linking observed political and corporate behaviors in China to specific stratagems from the aforementioned classical texts. While this approach offers a creative analytical framework, it does not assert empirical causality, instead inviting interpretative engagement with the materia.

### **Methodology**

This study primarily employs qualitative research methods, analyzing both primary and secondary sources while contextualizing findings through case-specific content analysis. Modern technological tools were utilized to systematically classify and quantify the frequency with which contemporary Chinese decision-makers reference classical authors and their philosophical tenets in public discourse. Relevance was determined through substantive alignment between specific stratagems and their corresponding real-world applications.

### **Findings**

The findings of this study once again underscore the fact that contemporary Chinese political and corporate decision-making processes actively engage with, analyze, and integrate classical Chinese stra-

tegic thought and the body of universal knowledge that has withstood the test of centuries. Specific cases drawn from corporate practices in the global market further emphasize the complex and long-term strategic approaches characteristic of Chinese society—approaches that remain challenging to fully comprehend not only for the Georgian public but also for the international community. Moreover, the research highlights the pressing need for a more in-depth examination of this subject matter and the importance of raising awareness within Georgian society. Such understanding is crucial to ensuring that, in the face of future geopolitical turbulence, we are better equipped and more strategically prepared.

### **Discussion**

**The Art of War** is arguably the most renowned Chinese strategic treatise, believed to have been composed in the 5th century BCE by Sun Zi (more commonly known as Sun Tzu, though we retain the conventional Georgian transliteration "სუნ ძი" due to its established use in the local literary context). According to historical accounts, Sun Zi was active at the court of the state of Wu, although the historicity of his person remains a subject of scholarly debate. Nevertheless, there is broad consensus among both Chinese and international historians regarding the universal applicability of **The Art of War** (Liu, 2012). The strategic insights contained within this text have remained relevant for over 2,500 years, demonstrating practical utility for medieval generals as well as for contemporary political leaders and corporate executives (Wu, 1996:115).

This study analyzes Georgian translation of **The Art of War**: directly from Classical Chinese by sinologist Zurab Mamniashvili. In the first chapter, Sun Zi discusses calculation and planning:

“Warfare is the way of deception: thus, if you are able, appear incapable; if you intend to act, seem inactive; if you are near, make the enemy believe you are far; if

you are far, make him believe you are near. Lure him with gain if he is greedy; take advantage of disorder; guard against strength; avoid confrontation when he is strong. Provoke him when he is angry; sow confusion when he is united; exhaust him when he is rested; divide him when he is in harmony. Strike where he does not expect it. Such is the true mastery of the general” (Sun Zi, 2023:16).

This strategy emphasizes the use of indirect and psychological methods prior to direct conflict. Victory is not merely about triumphing on the battlefield but about doing so efficiently and with minimal resistance. When extrapolated into a contemporary geopolitical context, these principles can be interpreted in relation to China’s “One China” policy and its strategic efforts to extend Beijing’s jurisdiction over the island of Taiwan, which regards itself as the legitimate heir of the Republic of China.

Notably, China has refrained from overt military engagement to achieve this objective, though it maintains the possibility of such action under certain conditions. Instead, it employs a synchronized approach that leverages historical memory (Xi, 2019), economic and cultural interconnectedness—which deepens annually—and periodic demonstrations of military capacity, such as drills conducted in proximity to the island. These exercises convey the potential for future encirclement or occupation (Mahadzir, 2025), aligning closely with Sun Zi’s notion of strategic deception and pressure without immediate confrontation.

The second chapter of **The Art of War** focuses on the art of actual engagement (作战), offering strategic counsel to commanders leading military expeditions into foreign territories. Of particular interest is Sun Zi’s emphasis on resource conservation:

“Military campaigns impoverish the state, as warfare demands the long-distance transportation of provisions. The cost of supplying the army depletes the nation’s resources, inflates local prices near the camps, drains the treasury, and burdens the people. Six-tenths of a state’s revenue is consumed by broken wagons and worn-out horses, armor repair, and weaponry. Therefore, a wise commander always seeks to feed his troops at the enemy’s expense. One chong (640 liters) of provisions seized from the enemy equals twenty chong spared from the homeland; one dan (100 liters) captured in the field equals twenty dan conserved at home” (Sun Zi, 2023:19).

While this passage directly concerns military logistics, its broader strategic implications resonate with contemporary Chinese environmental and industrial policy. Despite rapid industrial expansion in recent decades, China has simultaneously increased its national forest coverage through deliberate and large-scale afforestation initiatives. Regional and national greening programs have significantly expanded vegetative cover, even in areas adjacent to Asia’s largest deserts (Wei, Liu et al., 2024)

This raises a critical question: how does China continue to meet the resource demands of its manufacturing sector while increasing domestic forest cover? According to research by Forest Trends, over the past 15 years, China has significantly increased its imports of timber from abroad. The range of supplier countries is vast, including Siberia (Russia), Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, tropical Africa, and both Americas. This case study illustrates the enduring relevance and adaptability of Sun Zi’s second chapter: the strategic logic of minimizing domestic strain while externalizing costs remains deeply embedded in China’s modern policy framework.

## **Mastery of Offensive Strategy: Analysis of Chapter Three of The Art of War**

The third chapter of **The Art of War** concerns the mastery of offensive strategy. Sun Zi writes:

“To achieve victory in a hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting at all. Thus, the highest form of warfare is to thwart the enemy’s plans; the next best is to disrupt his alliances; then to attack his army; and the worst strategy is to besiege walled cities.”

In the same chapter, Sun Zi emphasizes the critical importance of assessing both one’s own capabilities and those of the adversary:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, you will suffer a defeat for every victory. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle” (Sun Zi, 2023:26).

These strategic principles reveal that Sun Zi placed the highest value not on brute force or costly sieges, but on winning through superior understanding, foresight, and psychological advantage. The ideal victory, in his framework, is one that avoids direct confrontation altogether.

When applied to contemporary corporate strategy, this principle is clearly reflected in the approach of major Chinese telecommunications brands such as Xiaomi and Huawei. These companies entered

developing markets gradually and quietly, initially targeting lower-priced product segments. Once brand familiarity and consumer trust were established, they expanded their offerings to include high-end products that directly challenged established global competitors such as Apple and Samsung (Acelingo, n.d.). A similar strategic pattern is evident in China's rare earth mineral strategy.

By the third decade of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China had come to dominate the global supply chain for rare earth elements—crucial inputs for modern technologies—without resorting to military force or geopolitical confrontation. What makes this dominance particularly notable is that many of these minerals are located outside China, in diverse regions and on multiple continents. Nonetheless, China has positioned itself as the central player in the processing and export of these critical materials (Karve International, 2024). This development has not gone unnoticed, particularly in the United States. Recent tensions and policy shifts between the U.S. and Ukraine concerning strategic mineral access reflect Washington's attempt to mitigate the national security risks posed by China's near-monopoly in this vital sector (Levimnt, 2024).

Additionally, Chapter Three of **The Art of War** addresses the personal qualities of a commander:

“The general is the pillar of the state: if the pillar is solid and unwavering, the state will be strong. If the pillar is cracked and unstable, the state will be weak”  
(Sun Zi, 2023:24).

Although China operates as a party-state—where political authority is largely concentrated within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—its leadership system features a robust meritocratic structure. Talent recruitment and cadre promotion are guided by performance



indicators and institutionalized mechanisms aimed at attracting high-caliber individuals into both government and party leadership roles (CGTN, 2019). This emphasis on talent is echoed in recent directives from the General Secretary, who has underscored the need to identify and empower qualified professionals not only in the public sector but also within private enterprise (State Council of the PRC, 2021).

### **Strategic Momentum and Adaptive Mastery: Insights from Chapters Five and Eight of *The Art of War***

In Chapter Five of **The Art of War**, titled “**Shi**” (勢)—often translated as “strategic momentum” or “potential force”—Sun Zi emphasizes the subtle use of deception, patient maneuvering, and the orchestration of forces in such a way that the enemy is overwhelmed without recourse to chance. A well-positioned and skillfully maneuvered army, he argues, can deliver a blow as unstoppable as a massive boulder rolling down a mountain. Victory, in this sense, is less about brute force and more about exploiting timing, terrain, and psychological disarray.

This concept is clearly manifested in the strategic rollout of TikTok (known domestically in China as **Douyin**). Its global debut came at a time when the entertainment market was ripe for disruption, particularly among younger demographics in Western nations. Through careful timing and aggressive adaptation, TikTok swiftly captured the attention of Generation Z and became a dominant force in digital entertainment (Karimi & Fox, 2023). The platform’s cultural influence has been so substantial that even governments have struggled to counter its momentum: the United States was compelled to retreat from efforts to ban the app, while in Romania, electoral campaigns conducted via TikTok significantly shaped youth voting behavior (Reuters, 2025).

Sun Zi also stresses the importance of intelligence and reconnaissance in the successful execution of strategy:

“Therefore, discern the enemy’s intentions to judge whether his plans are good or bad. Tempt him to reveal his formations and strategies. Entice him to expose his strengths and weaknesses. Engage him to test his deployments and identify where he is overextended or under-defended.” (Sun zi, 2023)

In modern practice, the People's Republic of China relies on a complex information-gathering network to monitor developments in target nations—not necessarily for military purposes, but for strategic economic engagement. These networks include diaspora communities, economic partnerships, and commercial liaisons. Open-source research and legislative records suggest that diaspora populations often play a pivotal role in providing insights into local market trends, investment opportunities, production capacities, and potential vulnerabilities (Pubrick, 2023). This intelligence is then used to strategically coordinate initiatives such as foreign direct investment, supply chain insertion, or mineral extraction.

Chapter Eight of **The Art of War** discusses the traits that can lead a commander—and by extension, a state—to failure. Sun Zi identifies five fatal flaws in leadership:

“There are five dangerous traits that may afflict a commander: recklessness, which leads to destruction; cowardice, which leads to capture; a quick temper, which can be provoked; a sense of honor, which is easily manipulated; and excessive compassion, which makes a leader vulnerable to suffering” (Sun Zi, 2023: 54).

These characteristics are not merely moral reflections—they are strategic liabilities. From 1978 onward, China’s foreign policy largely embraced a doctrine of strategic restraint, consistent with the concept of **tao guang yang hui** (韬光养晦), often translated as "hide brightness, nourish obscurity." According to the authoritative Sino-Georgian digital lexicon, the term denotes “concealing one’s capabilities and biding one’s time”—a principle echoed in Georgian literature as: “You must be a hero but walk like a coward; a master, but appear incompetent” (chinese.ge, 2025; cf. Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, **The Right Hand of the Grand Master**).

For decades, China applied this principle by abstaining from direct involvement in global conflicts, maintaining minimal engagement in turbulent geopolitical zones, and prioritizing internal socio-economic transformation. Rather than escalating tensions, Beijing opted for protocol diplomacy and avoided actions that could compromise its long-term strategic objectives.

The examples drawn from **The Art of War**, when considered alongside contemporary Chinese policies, reaffirm the enduring relevance and universal applicability of classical Chinese strategic thought. While the parallels drawn in this study are selective, it is evident that many of Sun Zi’s doctrines remain profoundly instructive for understanding modern statecraft, corporate strategy, and geopolitical positioning. Ultimately, the full application of these insights depends on scholarly interpretation and the contextual lenses through which modern phenomena are viewed.

### **The Thirty-Six Stratagems (三十六计): Classical Chinese Cunning in Modern Strategy**

Another prominent compendium of classical Chinese strategic thinking is the **Thirty-Six Stratagems** (三十六计, **san shi liu ji**). Alth-

ough the precise date of its origin remains debated among historians, most scholars agree that the current form was likely compiled during the Ming or Qing dynasties, synthesizing a wide range of stratagems and tactical principles developed over 1,500 to 2,000 years (Zhou, 2015). This paper draws primarily on the Georgian translation by Malkhaz Uturashvili, **36 Stratagems: The Secret Book of Military Art**, published by Meridiani in 2019.

A selection of stratagems from the collection is analyzed using the same interpretive method applied to **The Art of War**—that is, contextualizing classical principles within modern geopolitical or corporate realities.

### **Stratagem 3: 借刀杀人 (jie dao sha ren) – “Kill with a Borrowed Knife”**

This stratagem, which literally means "borrow a knife to kill someone," involves using a third party to execute one's aims, thereby avoiding direct confrontation. It aptly parallels the strategic posture of the People's Republic of China during the latter half of the Cold War. After the initiation of economic reforms and opening-up policies, China deliberately avoided becoming entangled in great power conflicts. Apart from a brief war with Vietnam, Beijing largely refrained from direct confrontations. It allowed the ideological and strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union to dominate the global stage, while it quietly focused on industrial development and internal consolidation.

For over a decade, China leveraged this geopolitical breathing space to attract foreign investment and modernize its economy—largely free from being perceived as a major geopolitical threat, thanks to the presence of more immediate global security concerns. This strategic discretion was further reinforced by China's low-profile foreign

policy, consistent with earlier discussions on the legacy of **The Art of War** (Chikhladze, 2025:250).

**Stratagem 5: 趁火打劫 (chen huo da jie) – “Loot a Burning House”**

This stratagem, meaning to profit from another’s misfortune, found modern corporate expression during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Virtually no country escaped the economic and logistical challenges of the crisis, including China. However, while Western fast fashion giants like H&M and ZARA faced severe disruptions—delayed orders, soaring prices, and declining customer satisfaction—Chinese ultra-fast fashion brand SHEIN capitalized on the moment.

Utilizing its fully integrated supply chain infrastructure in Guangzhou, which included over 6,000 domestic factories, and leveraging its proprietary digital platforms, SHEIN turned adversity into opportunity. Its effective logistical coordination and agile manufacturing allowed it to scale rapidly at a time when much of the global supply network was paralyzed. As a result, the company achieved historic sales highs during the peak of the pandemic (Sabio, 2024; Zhang et al., 2023).

**Stratagem 8: 暗度陈仓 (an du chen cang) – “Sneak Through Chen Cang”**

This stratagem involves using deception to conceal one’s true intentions. Its literal meaning, "to secretly cross through Chen Cang," evokes the idea of distracting with one visible action while executing a more significant maneuver in secret. A modern geopolitical analogy can be seen in China’s dual-track policy toward North Korea.

On one hand, China publicly supports diplomatic efforts around North Korea’s nuclear program and occasionally even enforces sanctions. On the other, it remains Pyongyang’s most important economic

partner, facilitating trade, providing technical support, and shielding it from complete international isolation. North Korea thus serves as both a geopolitical buffer between China and U.S. military bases in South Korea, and as a tool for strategic leverage. In this way, China positions itself as a constructive global actor while simultaneously maintaining a reliable bulwark against U.S. regional influence (Fong, 2024).

**Stratagem 9: 隔岸观火 (Ge an guan huo) – “Watch the Fire from Across the River”**

Closely related to Stratagem 20 (坐山观虎斗 – “Sit on the Mountain and Watch the Tigers Fight”), this principle emphasizes non-interventionism and strategic observation. Over the past 45 years, China has consistently applied this approach in its foreign policy—rarely engaging directly in global conflicts, yet often emerging in the final phase as a mediator or neutral party. Its roles in the Iran–Saudi Arabia détente and the North Korean nuclear dialogue are illustrative: China maintains a visible but calibrated presence, intervening diplomatically only when beneficial or necessary.

**Stratagem 14: 借尸还魂 (Jie shi huan hun) – “Revive the Soul by Borrowing a Corpse”**

This stratagem emphasizes the revitalization of an old idea through new means. One of the most striking contemporary applications is China’s **Belt and Road Initiative** (BRI)—a modern reinterpretation of the ancient Silk Road. As Feng (2015) notes, the BRI emerged in the 21st century as a core element of China’s grand strategy, reinvigorating historical trade concepts with global-scale infrastructure and geopolitical ambitions.

**Stratagem 17: 抛砖引玉 (Pao zhuan yin yu) – “Cast a Brick to Attract Jade”**

This strategy involves using a small offering to obtain a greater reward. China's long-term engagement with developing nations—particularly in Africa—demonstrates this principle in action. Through anti-colonial rhetoric, diplomatic support, and advocacy for equality on international platforms, China has gained favor among many nations once viewed as part of the “Third World” (Shinn, 2019:62). Today, China is among the most accepted and active economic partners on the African continent, securing access to critical minerals and raw materials while garnering consistent diplomatic support at the United Nations (Afripoli, 2023).

**Stratagem 23: 远交近攻 (Yuan jiao jin gong) – “Befriend the Distant, Attack the Near”**

This historically confirmed stratagem was notably applied by Mao Zedong during the Cold War. Amid deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and India, Mao strategically aligned with the United States—China's distant ideological rival at the time. As Kissinger (2011) recounts, this maneuver broke Beijing's geopolitical encirclement and reshaped global diplomatic alignments.

**Liu Tao (六韬) – The Six Secret Teachings**

Attributed to Jiang Ziya, **Liu Tao** is another foundational Chinese strategic classic that expands beyond military doctrine to encompass civil administration. As the text is not yet available in Georgian, this article references the modern Chinese-English edition translated and adapted by Cheng Song and edited by Shaun Connors (Connors, 2013).

### **Wen Tao (文韬) – Civil Strategy**

**Wen Tao** reflects key tenets of traditional Chinese political philosophy, blending Confucian and Legalist principles. It advocates for moral leadership, meritocratic governance, and public welfare as the foundation of state power. The ideal ruler is ethically exemplary, attracting trust from the people, while administrative positions must be filled based on talent rather than elite lineage. Governance requires a balance between civil and military competence, as state stability depends on the harmony of both domains. Excessive taxation or administrative burden, it warns, risks undermining the state's social contract.

### **Wu Tao (武韬) – Military Strategy**

**Wu Tao** discusses both military tactics and the moral and strategic responsibilities of a commander. Victory, it argues, is contingent upon the support of the people—without which any military campaign risks collapse. Thus, war must be morally justified and waged only in cases of necessity (Liu, 2012). The text also advocates for:

The use of espionage and information networks;

Psychological warfare to demoralize the enemy;

Integration of non-military tools such as diplomacy and economic pressure.

These principles echo **The Art of War** and retain relevance in both conventional and asymmetric conflict environments.

### **Long Tao (龙韬) – The Dragon Strategy**

The "Dragon Strategy" emphasizes flexibility, creativity, and adaptation. Rather than relying on brute force, it promotes the intelligent use of changing circumstances. Tactical advantage is gained through



unpredictability, disinformation, and dynamic planning—particularly by exploiting the opponent's weaknesses (Conners, 2013:64).

**Hu Tao (虎韬) – The Tiger Strategy: Aggressive Offense**

The Tiger Strategy emphasizes direct and overwhelming attacks designed to demoralize and exhaust the opponent's resources quickly. Though highly effective under the right conditions, it is resource-intensive and carries substantial risk if poorly executed (Conners, 2013:116). It is most applicable in scenarios requiring rapid disruption of an adversary's operational cohesion.

**Bao Tao (豹韬) – The Leopard Strategy: Speed and Manipulation**

In contrast to the Tiger, the Leopard Strategy favors speed, cunning, and indirect tactics. It is especially suited for weaker but agile forces facing superior enemies. Key elements include:

Formation of strategic alliances;

Provoking discord among rivals;

Use of psychological warfare through disinformation and rumor (Conners, 2013:119).

**Quan Tao (犬韬) – The Dog Strategy: Domestic Stability and Loyalty**

The Dog Strategy concerns not battlefield maneuvers but internal governance. It underscores the need for hierarchical discipline, the maintenance of social order, and the cultivation of public loyalty—foundations of national resilience and internal security (Conners, 2013:126).

## Sima's Methods of War (司马法): Order, Discipline, and Strategic Adaptation

The final classical Chinese strategic text examined is **Sima Fa** (司马法), attributed to Sima Rangu. Like **Liu Tao**, this work has not been translated into Georgian, and the analysis here is based on the modern Chinese-English edition edited by Shaun Connors and translated by Cheng Sung. **Sima Fa** blends military, political, and legal wisdom, presenting a doctrine of systematized discipline and adaptive strategy.

Two core principles underpin this treatise:

**Rigorous discipline as the foundation of power;**

**Creative adaptativity as the instrument of victory.**

The text outlines the necessity of a well-structured, hierarchical military system in which all components function in unified coordination. Yet, Sima stresses that true mastery begins before combat—through psychological disruption, resource manipulation, and demoralization of the adversary.

Politically, **Sima Fa** places strong emphasis on unity and loyalty, which must be grounded in just governance and transparent reward systems. The treatise also evaluates alliances as temporary instruments of strength—tools that must be used strategically to isolate enemies or mobilize resources, but not relied upon in the long term. This viewpoint aligns with China's contemporary skepticism of formal military alliances, which it often characterizes as sources of global instability (Jevans, 2024).

In modern terms, Sima's methods may be applied to military operations, corporate management, and political strategy. Their core message is that the success of any organized system depends on:

**Standardized procedures (discipline);**

**Flexible resource allocation (adaptability);**

**Psychological superiority (disorientation of adversaries);**

**Strategic use of temporary alliances.**

Though formulated in the 4th century BCE, these principles remain relevant to contemporary strategic thinking across various domains.

## **Conclusion**

The classical Chinese strategic corpus represents a profound contribution to global intellectual and philosophical heritage. The four texts analyzed in this article span centuries—from the 9th century BCE to the later imperial periods—and continue to offer frameworks applicable far beyond their original military contexts.

More than collections of tactical advice, these works embody a universal strategic philosophy—adaptable not only to warfare but also to statecraft, corporate governance, and international relations. The examples explored here—ranging from China's geopolitical maneuvers to its corporate strategies—underscore the continuing relevance of these teachings in the 21st century.

Despite their significance, Chinese classical strategies remain understudied in Georgian historiography and Sinology. This article

aims to encourage further exploration of these texts, both in academic and policy-making contexts. A deeper engagement with Chinese strategic thought can enrich Georgia's strategic discourse and offer new perspectives on global developments.

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